Distressed Debt & Loan-to-Own Lab

Model secondary debt trading at discounts, fulcrum class debt-for-equity swaps, Bankruptcy Code §1126(c) blocking stakes, rights offering backstops, and post-emergence turnaround returns.

Secondary Market Discounts Fulcrum Loan-to-Own §1126(c) Plan Voting Debt-for-Equity Turnaround
Advertisement
Investor Cost Basis
$33.0M (55.0¢)
Purchase Price on Debt
Fulcrum Voting Stake
50.0%
Negative Blocking Stake
Emergence Equity Stake
$81.3M (45.0%)
Reorganized Ownership
Emergence Paper Return
1.95x Paper MOIC
Day-1 Post-Bankruptcy
Turnaround Exit Payout
$187.6M
At Year 4 Secondary Exit
Distressed Investor Return
38.45% (4.49x)
Gross Yield & MOIC
Par Creditor Recovery
68.4% Emergence
Haircut on $100 Par
Reorganized Equity Value
$180.5M
Emergence Plan Equity
Negative Blocking Position (33.4%+): Investor holds a blocking position under Bankruptcy Code §1126(c).
Presets:
Distressed Debt Acquisition
1. Pre-Petition Capital Stack & Purchase
2. Chapter 11 & Reorganization Plan
3. Operational Turnaround & Secondary Exit
Bankruptcy Code §1126(c) Voting Rules
  • Dollar Acceptance Threshold ≥ 66.67% (Two-Thirds of Voted Debt)
  • Numerosity Acceptance Threshold > 50% (Majority in Number of Claimants)
  • Negative Veto Blocking Stake > 33.34% of Dollar Amount
  • Cramdown Control Requirement ≥ 1 Impaired Accepting Class (§1129(a)(10))
  • Absolute Priority Rule Senior Paid in Full Before Junior Gets $1
Emergence Enterprise Value allocation across Senior Debt, Admin Claims, Investor Equity, and Other Reorganized Equity.
Secondary purchase price discount (cents on dollar) vs Turnaround MOIC and Gross IRR.
Post-emergence operational turnaround equity expansion over the holding period.
Post-Emergence Turnaround Schedule
Year EBITDA Exit Debt Enterprise Value Total Equity Investor Equity Leverage
Investor MOIC vs Purchase Price & EV
Turnaround Gross IRR vs Exit Multiple & Growth

Institutional Architecture & Mathematical Mechanics

In corporate restructuring and special situations investing, Distressed Debt & Loan-to-Own strategies represent the ultimate intersection of finance, bankruptcy law, and corporate control. By acquiring the "fulcrum security" at a steep discount in the secondary loan or high-yield bond market, sophisticated distressed investors position themselves to convert debt claims into majority common equity ownership of the restructured enterprise.

Bankruptcy Code §1126(c) Voting Power

Plan acceptance requires satisfying dual statutory thresholds:

$$\text{Acceptance} \iff \sum_{\text{voted}} \$ \ge \frac{2}{3} \quad \text{AND} \quad \sum_{\text{voted}} N \ge \frac{1}{2}$$

Acquiring >33.34% of the dollar amount of the fulcrum tranche grants an investor a negative blocking stake, allowing them to veto any unfavorable Chapter 11 reorganization plan and dictate consensual debt-for-equity terms.

Fulcrum Security Identification

The fulcrum class is the tranche that straddles distributable value:

$$D_{\text{senior}} < V_{\text{distributable}} < D_{\text{senior}} + D_{\text{fulcrum}}$$

Because senior debt is satisfied in full and junior claims/equity are completely wiped out ($0 recovery under the Absolute Priority Rule), the fulcrum class receives the entire residual equity of the newly reorganized company.

The Asymmetric Cost Basis Advantage

Distressed investors purchase claims at a discount to par:

$$\text{Cost Basis} = D_{\text{purchased}} \times P_{\text{cents}} \ll V_{\text{emergence equity}}$$

While original creditors who bought debt at 100¢ suffer significant paper write-downs, the distressed investor who entered at 50¢ captures immediate Day-1 paper gains and equity upside during post-bankruptcy recovery.

Rights Offering Backstop Economics

Emergence equity is further expanded through backstops:

$$\text{Equity}_{\text{backstop}} = \frac{\text{Rights Size} \times \text{Backstop Fee}\%}{P_{\text{discounted}}}$$

Distressed sponsors guarantee emergency emergence capital, collecting a 5% to 10% fee in free equity and purchasing additional shares at a 20% to 35% discount to plan equity value.

Formative Assessment: Distressed Debt Mastery

Frequently Asked Questions

A loan-to-own strategy is a private equity or distressed debt strategy where an investor purchases debt of a troubled company at a steep discount in the secondary market (e.g. 40 to 65 cents on the dollar) with the explicit objective of converting that debt into majority control of the company's reorganized common equity through a Chapter 11 debt-for-equity swap.

The fulcrum security is the specific tier in the company's capital stack that sits right at the break in value—it is the most senior tranche of debt that is not paid in full in cash. Because it is partially impaired while all junior tranches and pre-petition equity are extinguished ($0), the fulcrum class receives the vast majority of the newly issued common equity in the reorganized business.

Under Bankruptcy Code §1126(c), an impaired class of claims accepts a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization only if approved by creditors holding at least two-thirds (66.7%) in dollar amount of claims voted and more than one-half (50%) in total number of voting creditors. Consequently, holding more than 33.34% of the dollar claims creates a 'negative blocking stake' that can unilaterally veto the plan.

To emerge from Chapter 11, companies often conduct an emergency equity rights offering to repay DIP loans and fund working capital. Distressed sponsors agree to 'backstop' the rights offering by committing to purchase any unsubscribed shares. In exchange, the sponsor earns a backstop commitment fee (typically 5% to 10% paid in emergence equity) and acquires additional shares at an attractive 20% to 35% discount to plan equity value.

An original creditor who purchased debt at par ($100 face value) suffers a permanent principal loss (haircut) if the debt converts into emergence equity worth 65 cents on the dollar. In contrast, a distressed investor who acquired that same debt at 50 cents on the dollar generates an immediate 1.30x paper MOIC at emergence, and subsequently reaps high equity IRRs (25% to 40%+) as operational turnaround and multiple expansion take hold.

Related Institutional Finance Labs

DIP Financing & Chapter 11 Lab

Model Bankruptcy Code §364 superpriority priming liens, debt roll-ups, and 13-week budget variance covenants.

Second Lien Debt & Intercreditor Lab

Model junior secured debt, silent intercreditor agreements, 90-180 day standstills, and fulcrum recovery.

Liability Management & Uptier Priming Lab

Model non-pro-rata uptier exchanges, Serta open-market purchases, J.Crew drop-downs, and recovery waterfalls.